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INTRODUCTION
John Giebeler suffers from the deadly disease Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome ("AIDS").' Due to the advanced stage of his AIDS, Giebeler is disabled and
can no longer work.2 Prior to becoming disabled by AIDS, Giebeler had worked as a
psychiatric technician for five years, earning approximately $36,000 per year.
3
However, since he became disabled in 1997, Giebeler's income has consisted only of
monthly Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSI") benefits and housing assistance
from the Housing Opportunities for People with AIDS program ("HOPWA").
4
In May 1997, Giebeler tried to rent an apartment at the Park Branham Apartments
("Branham") in San Francisco because he could no longer afford his monthly rent of
J.D. Candidate, 2005, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 2002,
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1. Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1145.
4. Id.
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over $1500. 5 By moving to Branham, Giebeler would save almost $700 per month in
67
rent. The new apartment would also be within a mile of his mother's house,7 allowing
his mother, Anne Giebeler, to more effectively watch over and care for him.
However, Branham informed Giebeler that he did not meet the income
qualifications under its rent-admission policy 8 because his monthly gross income was
not at least three times the monthly rent.9 Giebeler would not be eligible to rent at
Branham despite the facts that Giebeler had a six-year record of consistent and prompt
payment of rent of over $700 more than the rent at Branham and that he had no
negative notations on his credit record.' 0
Giebeler's mother went to Branham the next day and offered to sign the lease and
be financially responsible for the monthly rent payments for Giebeler. 11 Even though
Anne's income more than qualified for the apartment, 2 Branham rejected the
application on the basis that it "considered Anne Giebeler a cosigner and [it] has a
policy against allowing co-signers on lease agreements."' 3 In short, because Branham's
rent-admission policy prohibited Giebeler from counting a source of income that would
have made him eligible for the apartment-his mother--Giebeler was denied the
opportunity to rent a cheaper apartment that was closer to his mother.
A few years earlier, a similar series of events occurred on Long Island to Richard
Salute, an individual whose disabilities included chronic asthma, dextroscoliosis of the
back, diverticulitis, ulcerative colitis, and depression.' 4 Like Giebeler, Salute received
Social Security disability benefits. In addition, Salute was also found eligible to receive
low-income housing assistance under the Section 8 housing program.
15
Section 8 is administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD").16 Under this program, the Section 8 certificate recipient must find an
apartment that meets the rent guidelines, and the landlord must agree to participate in
the program.17 A Section 8 recipient is responsible for only a set portion of the rent to
the landlord, with the government paying the remaining portion. I8 Landlord
participation in the program is voluntary; landlords can legally refuse to rent to Section
8 recipients.19
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. The term "rent-admission policy" refers to the standards adopted by a landlord or
property manager establishing the criteria for acceptable tenants among those who apply for an
apartment to rent. Often, these standards include minimal income level requirements.
9. 343 F.3d at 1145.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Salute v. Stratford Greens, 918 F. Supp. 660,662 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
15. Id. Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 involves housing assistance
for low-income individuals. See United States Housing Act of 1937 § 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f
(2000).
16. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1998).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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After spending five years on the Section 8 waitlist, Salute received his certificate
and found an apartment that met the applicable rent guidelines at the Stratford Greens
apartment complex. 20 Stratford Greens's property manager, however, had a policy
against accepting applications from Section 8 recipients because he did not want to
"get involved with the federal government and its rules and any accompanying
regulations." 21 After Salute was refused an apartment at Stratford Greens, his Section 8
certificate properly reverted to the government. 22 Thus, Salute was left both without an
apartment at Stratford Greens and without his Section 8 certificate.
Giebeler and Salute each filed suit against the property managers of their respective
apartment buildings. 23 Each complaint included a count alleging that the defendants
had violated the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA") 24 by
refusing to make a change in their rental qualification policies, and therefore not
reasonably accommodating Giebeler's and Salute's disabilities. On appeal, the
Second Circuit26 and the Ninth Circuit27 reached opposite conclusions as to whether §
3604(f)(3)(B) requires landlords to make reasonable accommodations for the economic
status of a disabled individual. The Second Circuit held that accommodating for the
disabled individual's financial situation was "not 'necessary' to afford handicapped
persons 'equal opportunity' to use and enjoy a dwelling," 28 a conclusion also reached
29by the Seventh Circuit. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit arrived at the opposite
conclusion, holding that a change to a landlord's application policy can be a required
accommodation under the FHAA even though the change is based upon "financial
considerations."
30
The resolution of this circuit split will have a tremendous impact on landlords and
disabled tenants throughout the country. The decisions in the Second and Seventh
Circuits have already caused great concern for the many advocates of disabled
individuals: "[Riecent decisions have severely limited the potential applicability of
reasonable accommodations in overcoming disability-caused economic barriers to
tenancy." 31 In other words, the decisions in the Second and Seventh Circuits add to the
housing crisis faced by 3.7 million disabled adults in this country who rely on SSI
20. Salute v. Stratford Greens, 918 F. Supp. at 662.
21. Id. (citing Monter Aff., May 15, 1995, 4).
22. Id. (explaining how Section 8 certificates revert back to the local housing agency).
23. See Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2003); Salute v.
Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d at 295.
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000).
25. Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1146; Salute, 136 F.3d at 296.
26. Salute, 136 F.3d 293.
27. Giebeler, 343 F.3d 1143.
28. Salute, 136 F.3d at 302 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)) (emphasis omitted).
29. See Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437,440 (7th Cir.
1999); see also Schanz v. Village Apartments, 998 F. Supp. 784,792 (E.D. Mich. 1998) ("[I]t is
plaintiff's financial situation which impedes him from renting an apartment at The Village, and
it is plaintiffs financial situation which he is requesting that defendants accommodate. The
FHAA does not require that this be done.").
30. Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1153.
31. Sherry Trafford, Using Reasonable Accommodations to Preserve Rights of Tenants
with Disabilities, 33 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 131, 141 (1999) (referring to the Salute and Schanz
decisions).
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benefits as their source of income.32 Those who are disabled and survive on their
Social Security benefits, like Giebeler and Salute, will never be able to qualify for an
apartment where the landlord's application policy follows the standard industry
practice of requiring that the prospective renter's income be at least three times the
rent.33 According to one study,
[i]n 2002, for the first time ever, the average national rent was greater than the
[average] amount of income received by Americans with disabilities from the
federal SSI program. Specifically, the average rent for a modest one-bedroom
rental unit in the United States was equal to 105 percent of [the average] SSI
benefit amounts .... 34
Thus, when disabled individuals' monthly income is roughly equal to the monthly
rent, these individuals-according to the Second and Seventh Circuits-will never be
able to rent from those landlords and owners who follow the industry standard of the
income-to-rent ratio for prospective tenants.
This result is especially troublesome for those disabled individuals who would
otherwise be able to afford to rent these apartments due to housing subsidies they
receive from the Section 8 program, as in Salute's case, or from other charitable or
familial sources, as in Giebeler's case. Despite the fact that these individuals would be
able to afford the housing with the help of their subsidies, landlords in the Second and
Seventh Circuits are not required to deviate from their policies to accommodate for
these individuals' disabilities. This result, in terms of social policy, is not one that we
should embrace. But more fundamentally, the reasoning used by the Second and
Seventh Circuits conflicts with the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in U.S.
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.
35
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of the purpose of the FHAA. It will also
explain the relationship between the reasonable accommodation clauses contained in
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"),36 the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"),37 and the FHAA. 38 Part II examines the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits' analyses of accommodating for the economic status of a
disabled renter. Finally, this Note will conclude that landlords and property owners are
not automatically exempted from the FHAA's reasonable accommodation provision
when asked to modify their rent-admission policies to accommodate for the economic
status caused by the individual renter's disability.
32. ANN O'HARA & EMILY COOPER, TEcHNIcAL ASsISTANCE COUABORATIVE &
CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS wrTH DtsABnIrrEs Hous. TASK FORCE, PRicED OUT IN 2002 1 (2003),
http://www.c-c-d.orgIPO2002.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
38. Id. § 3604(f(3)(B).
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1. OVERVIEW OF THE FHAA AND THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION CLAUSE
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968.' 9 The FHA initially only prohibited discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing on the account of race, color, religion, or national origin.4 In 1988, however,
Congress amended the FHA by passing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
which extended the scope of prohibited discrimination to include discrimination
against handicapped persons.4
A. Purpose of the FHAA
By extending protection of the FHA to disabled individuals, Congress intended the
FHAA to be "a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end the unnecessary
exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream.' 42 The FHAA
makes it unlawful to "discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap.'43 It further defines
discrimination to include "a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules,
policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford
such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 44 Thus, the FHAA
"imposes an affirmative duty upon landlords reasonably to accommodate the needs of
handicapped persons. '45 This duty includes not only the accommodation of physical
needs, but also accommodation in the administrative "rules, policies, [and] practices"
of the landlords. 6
B. Incorporation of Existing "Reasonable Accommodation" Doctrine into the
FHAA
In addition to the FHAA, Congress has also passed the Rehabilitation Act 47 and the
ADA,48 both of which contain reasonable accommodation provisions pertaining to
disabled individuals.49 In the House Committee Report on the FHAA, the House of
39. See Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631).
40. See id.
41. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, sec. 6, §§ 804-
806, 102 Stat. 1619, 1620-22 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606).
42. H.R. REp. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) (2000).
44. Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
45. United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir.
1994).
46.42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2000).
47. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961 (2000)).
48. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (defining discrimination as "not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
20051
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Representatives clearly stated its intention to incorporate the then-existing principles of
"reasonable accommodation" provisions:
New subsection 804(f)(3)(B) makes it illegal to refuse to make reasonable
accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services if necessary to permit a
person with handicaps equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. The concept
of "reasonable accommodation" has a long history in regulations and case law
dealing with discrimination on the basis of handicap. A discriminatory rule,
policy, practice, or service is not defensible simply because that is the manner in
which such rule or practice has traditionally been constituted. This section would
require that changes be made to such traditional rules or practices if necessary to
permit a person with handicaps an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.50
The House Committee Report further explained that "[in adopting this amendment,
the Committee drew on case law developed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 .... Handicapped individuals are 'otherwise qualified' if, with reasonable
accommodation, they can satisfy all the requirements for a position or services." 51
Consistent with the House Committee Report, courts have acknowledged that Congress
borrowed the reasonable accommodation language in the FHAA from regulations and
case law interpreting the same language in the Rehabilitation Act, and that Congress
intended for this case law to supply the governing standard in determining what
accommodations are reasonable under the FHAA.52 Since Congress intended the
reasonable accommodation provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and FHAA to
be interpreted under the same principles and then-existing case law, it follows that
Congress intended these provisions to be so substantially similar that subsequent case
law interpreting one of these provisions should provide guidance for the interpretation
of the other reasonable accommodation provisions. In fact, courts have often used case
law governing one of these statutes' provisions to interpret another statute's
provision.
53
Thus, in order to correctly interpret the reasonable accommodation provision of the
FHAA, it is critically important to understand not only governing case law interpreting
the FHAA provision, but also case law that interprets the parallel Rehabilitation Act
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity").
50. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 25 (1988)(footnote omitted), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2186 (citing Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); 45
C.F.R. § 84.12 (1988)) (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 28 (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 406; Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658
F.2d 1372, 1385-87 (10th Cir. 1981)).
52. See, e.g., Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson, 84 F.3d 960, 962 (7th Cir. 1996);
Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 334-35 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Cal.
Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416-18 (9th Cir. 1994); Means v. City of
Dayton, 111 F. Supp. 2d 969,977 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Roe v. Hous. Auth., 909 F. Supp. 814,820
(D. Colo. 1995); Judy B. v. Borough of Tioga, 889 F. Supp. 792, 799 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
53. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474,477 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003); Henrietta
D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261,275-76 (2d Cir. 2003); Good Shephard Manor Found., Inc. v.
City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2003); Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 325 F.3d
609, 622-23 (5th Cir. 2003), vacated by 339 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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and ADA provisions. Although the case law interpreting the Rehabilitation Act and
ADA provisions may not directly govern over the FHAA provision, it is certainly
highly influential, especially when the case law comes from the Supreme Court.
C. The Supreme Court and the Reasonable Accommodation Provisions
When interpreting the FHAA's reasonable accommodation provision, the Court has
clearly emphasized the importance of the statute's "'broad and inclusive' compass, 54
and the need to be "mindful of the Act's stated policy 'to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."' 55 So, when analyzing the
contrasting reasoning used by the courts in Salute and Giebeler, it is first necessary to
understand that such analysis must be done with the specific goals of the FHAA in
mind.
Perhaps the Court's "most extensive discussion of the overall scope of the
accommodation concept"56 appears in a recent ADA case, U.S. Airways v. Barnett.57 In
that case, an airline cargo handler, Barnett, injured his back while working for U.S.
Airways.58 Barnett then transferred to a less physically demanding mailroom position.
5 9
Two years later, Barnett learned that two employees senior to him intended to invoke
the company's seniority system policy and bid for Barnett' s job.60 Barnett asked U.S.
Airways to accommodate his disability by making an exception to the company's
seniority system and allowing him to keep the mailroom job.6' U.S. Airways denied
Barnett's request and followed its seniority system, granting Barnett's job to a senior
employee.62 Unable to work in a more physically demanding position, Barnett lost his
job.63 Barnett then brought an ADA suit against U.S. Airways, claiming, among other
things, that the "mailroom job amounted to a 'reasonable accommodation' of his
disability, and that U.S. Airways, in refusing to assign him the job, unlawfully
discriminated against him."
64
U.S. Airways argued that the reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA
"seeks only 'equal' treatment for those with disabilities. It does not... require an
employer to grant preferential treatment." 65 Thus, according to U.S. Airways, any
preferential exception to a disability-neutral policy, such as the seniority rule, would
54. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995) (quoting
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
55. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000)).
56. Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003).
57. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
58. Id. at 394.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 394-95.
65. Id. at 397 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) (citation
omitted).
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automatically exceed the intended scope of the reasonable accommodation provision of
the ADA. 66
The Court rejected this argument, holding that "preferences will sometimes prove
necessary to achieve the Act's basic equal opportunity goal, ' 67 and "the Act does not
create any such automatic exemption. ' ' s This holding, which is further discussed in
Part 1I below, will be critical in analyzing the contrasting views in the Second and
Ninth Circuits.
D. Reasonable Accommodation Claims
As previously stated, discrimination covered by the FHAA includes "a refusal to
make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling." 69 In order to establish a claim of discrimination based on failure to
reasonably accommodate, the plaintiff must show that (1) he suffers from a disability
as defined by the FHAA, (2) the landlord or property manager knew or reasonably
should have known of the disability, (3) accommodation of the disability "may be
necessary to afford" the disabled individual an equal opportunity "to use and enjoy"
the dwelling, 70 and (4) the landlord or property manager refused to make the requested
accommodation.7 t
The majority of cases brought under the FHAA's reasonable accommodation
provision are brought against government entities by parties requesting relief from
zoning restrictions, or are brought against landlords or property managers by already
disabled tenants seeking access to parking spaces, service animals, or other reasonable
accommodations.7 2 This Note, however, addresses cases like Salute and Giebeler,
which involve a disabled individual who requests the modification of certain financial
requirements of a rental application so as to accommodate the individual's financial
situation.
Both Salute and Giebeler recognized the two step inquiry that must be made in the
analysis of all reasonable accommodation claims.73 First, the court must determine
whether the accommodation sought by the disabled individual is an accommodation
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 398.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2000).
70. Id.
71. See United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1380 (9th
Cir. 1997); Schanz v. Viii. Apartments, 998 F. Supp. 784,791 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Roseborough
v. Cottonwood Apartments, No. 94 C 3708, 1996 WL 490717, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 1996);
Ocean Sands, Inc., HUDALJ 04-90-0231-1, 1993 WL 343530, at *11 (H.U.D.A.L.J. Sept. 3,
1993).
72. For a discussion on these types of cases, see Polly W. Blakemore, Note, Short of
Money or Shortchanged?: Reasonable Accommodations in Rental Rules and Policies for
Disabled Individuals Receiving FinancialAssistance, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 449,461 nn. 107-111
and accompanying text (2000).
73. See Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003); Salute v.
Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Lapid-Laurel,
L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 457 (3d Cir. 2002).
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within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).7 4 Second, the court must determine
whether the accommodation is reasonable.75 As the Ninth Circuit observed in
Giebeler, "[t]here is some tendency in the case law to truncate the 'accommodation'
concept so as to preclude requirements that unreasonably burden housing providers,
rather than conducting the two-step analysis mandated by the statute." 76 The first
inquiry, whether an accommodation fits within the intended scope of the statute, is
exactly where the circuits split in their outcome and in their analysis. As the Ninth
Circuit described, the Second and Seventh Circuits hold that "however reasonable the
requested accommodation, the FHAA does not require landlords or cities to
accommodate needs generated by the inability of disabled individuals to generate
income by working."" The Ninth Circuit in Giebeler, however, correctly held that such
an interpretation of the FHAA cannot stand in light of Barnett.
II. DISABLED RENTER'S ECONOMIC STATUS UNDER THE FHAA'S REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION PROVISION
A. Analytical Approach of Salute and Hemisphere
As already mentioned, Salute involved a disabled individual who received a Section
8 certificate. He found an appropriate one-bedroom apartment, but the property
manager refused to rent to him because Salute was a Section 8 recipient.78 Salute then
filed suit under the FHAA, claiming that the property manager was required to
accommodate Salute's disability by waiving the policy of not accepting Section 8
recipients. 79 Because this was a reasonable accommodation claim, the court proceeded
with the two-step inquiry.
80
Peculiarly, the court chose to address the second part of the inquiry first-
determining whether requiring the property manager to waive his policy regarding
Section 8 renters was reasonable.8 ' The court affirmed the district court's decision by
74. Salute, 136 F.3d at 300; Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1148.
75. Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1148.
76. id.
77. Id. at 1153 (citing Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Vill. of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437 (7th
Cir. 1999); Salute, 136 F.3d at 301-02); see also Schanz v. Vill. Apartments, 998 F. Supp. 784,
792 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (arriving at the same conclusion as Salute).
78. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
79. Salute, 136 F.3d at 296.
80. Id. at 300.
81. Id. The dissent criticizes the majority for approaching the inquiry in reverse order:
In so doing, the majority once again displays an unrelenting eagerness
to decide far more than it needs to resolve the case before it. It would be
one thing if the majority assumed arguendo that participation in Section 8
was an accommodation under the statute and then held that such an
accommodation was unreasonable as a matter of law. But instead the
majority... goes on also to affirm on the alternate ground-that "economic
discrimination-such as the refusal to accept Section 8 tenants-is not
cognizable as a failure to make reasonable accommodations." Given this
second finding, its first holding is wholly superfluous.
2005]
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holding that such an accommodation, regardless as to whether it was a type of
accommodation intended to fit within the scope of the statute, was not a reasonable
accommodation.8 2 The court offered two reasons that the accommodation was not
reasonable. First, the court stated that the Section 8 program was intended to be purely
voluntary for landlords: "We think that the voluntariness provision of Section 8 reflects
a congressional intent that the burdens of Section 8 participation are substantial enough
that participation should not be forced on landlords, either as an accommodation to
handicap or otherwise."8 3 Second, the court stated that forcing a landlord to participate
in the Section 8 program would be burdensome on the landlord because participation
in the program requires substantial government involvement: "A landlord may consider
that participation in a federal program will or may entail financial audits, maintenance
requirements, inspection of the premises, reporting requirements, increased risk of
litigation, and so on."84 For these two reasons, the court concluded that an
accommodation requiring the landlord to participate in the Section 8 program was not
"reasonable" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
After resolving the second prong of the inquiry, the court then discussed whether
requiring a landlord to participate in the Section 8 program should even be considered
an accommodation under the FHAA at all, an inquiry that usually precedes the
reasonableness inquiry. The court reiterated that an accommodation must be
"'necessary' to afford handicapped persons 'equal opportunity' to use and enjoy a
dwelling" in order to fall within the scope of the FHAA. 5
In order to reach the conclusion that requiring the landlord to participate in the
Section 8 program was not an accommodation that fit this definition, the court first
found that such an accommodation would be shaped by the economic status of the
disabled individual-and not by the disability as the statute requires. According to the
court, "the duty to make reasonable accommodations is framed by the nature of the
particular handicap."86 To illustrate this point, the court provided a list of cases where
the valid requested accommodation addressed only the disability itself 8 7 In addition,
the court cited HUD regulations that provided two examples illustrating when a
reasonable accommodation would be required: "[T]he lifting of a no-pets rule to allow
use of a seeing-eye dog; or the waiver of a first-come, first-serve policy on parking
spots to accommodate the impaired mobility of a person suffering from multiple
sclerosis."8 8 The court argued that in all of these cases, and the HUD regulation
examples, it was the disability itself that was accommodated, not a "disadvantage[] that
Id. at 307 n. 16 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 302.
83. Id. at 300.
84. Id. at 301.
85. Id. at 302 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2000)).
86. Id. at 301.
87. Id. (citing Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 894-95 (7th Cir.
1996) (parking space as accommodation for multiple sclerosis sufferer); Bronk v. Ineichen, 54
F.3d 425,429 (7th Cir. 1995) (hearing dog as accommodation for deaf individuals); Shapiro v.
Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 330 (2d Cir. 1995) (parking space as accommodation for
multiple sclerosis sufferer); United States v. Bd. of Trs. for Univ. of Ala., 908 F.2d 740, 746
(11 th Cir. 1990) (sign language interpreter as accommodation for deaf students).
88. Salute, 136 F.3d at 301 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) (2004)).
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may be correlated with having handicaps."8 9 The court then contrasted these situations
with the one in Salute where the disabled plaintiff sought to use the reasonable
accommodation provision to "remedy economic discrimination... without regard to
handicap." 9 According to the court, this difference distinguished economic
accommodation claims from legitimate disability accommodation claims.
Furthermore, the court held that a landlord's policy of not accepting Section 8
renters was a neutral policy that did not discriminate against the disabled. 91 Thus,
because "Congress could not have intended the FHAA to require reasonable
accommodations for those with handicaps every time a neutral policy imposes an
adverse impact on individuals who are poor,"92 the statute could not require such an
accommodation. Otherwise, according to the court, poor disabled individuals would
receive preferential treatment over poor nondisabled individuals. 93 Such treatment
would no longer be providing the disabled individual an "equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling," as required by 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), but would instead be
providing the disabled individual with a preferential opportunity beyond that which is
equal.94 Thus, because the duty to accommodate was not shaped by the handicap and,
as the court stated, "[t]he FHAA does not elevate the rights of the handicapped poor
over the rights of the non-handicapped poor,"95 an accommodation requiring the
landlord to change his admission policy against Section 8 renters was not, and could
never be, an accommodation that fit within the meaning of the statute, regardless of
whether it was reasonable or not.96
In Hemisphere, a case involving a different factual context than Salute, the Seventh
Circuit reached the same legal conclusion as the Second Circuit: the reasonable
accommodation provision of the FHAA never requires an accommodation that is
shaped by the economic limitations that a disability generates.97 Hemisphere was a
developer who wished to construct nine townhouses specifically designed to
accommodate for the needs of disabled individuals9" on a property in the Village of
89. Id.
90. Id. at 302.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Hubbard v. Samson Mgmt. Corp., 994 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
("Accomodations that go beyond affording a handicapped tenant 'an equal opportunity to use
and enjoy a dwelling' are not required by the Act.") (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2000));
see also Sporn v. Ocean Colony Condo. Ass'n, 173 F. Supp. 2d 244, 250 (D.N.J. 200 1) (using
the same language).
95. Salute, 136 F.3d at 302.
96. See also Schanz v. Vill. Apartments, 998 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (arriving
at the same conclusion as Salute where the disabled tenant was not trying to use Section 8, but
rather funds from a third-party charitable organization).
97. Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Vill. of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1999).
98. Although the homes would be available to both disabled and nondisabled
individuals, the homes would be built in order to accommodate the needs of disabled residents.
Specifically, the designs included wider doors, lower light switches, roll-in showers, high toilet
seats, and preinstalled grab bars in the bathroom. In addition, the units would be built
horizontally instead of vertically, further accommodating the needs of disabled residents.
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Richton Park ("The Village"). The Village had certain zoning ordinances prescribing
the maximum density (number of dwelling units per acre) allowed. 99 In order to make
the homes economically feasible for disabled individuals, the developer had to exceed
the maximum density by a few units. 10 Hemisphere requested that The Village make
an exception to its zoning ordinance in order to accommodate disabled occupants, but
The Village denied this request. 10 As a result, Hemisphere, along with a prospective
disabled resident of the proposed development, brought suit against The Village,
claiming that 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) required that The Village make such an
accommodation.1
0 2
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that if the reasonable accommodation provision
required that the standards in the zoning policy be ignored, then it would follow, as a
slippery slope, that developers of housing for the disabled would also be allowed to
ignore "a local building code that increased the cost of construction, or for that matter a
minimum wage law, or regulations for the safety of construction workers."' 03 The court
considered such a result to be absurd and held that it must be avoided:
The result that we have called absurd is avoided by confining the duty of
reasonable accommodation in "rules, policies, practices, or services" to rules,
policies, etc. that hurt handicapped people by reason of their handicap, rather than
that hurt them solely by virtue of what they have in common with other people,
such as a limited amount of money to spend on housing.
104
With this ruling, the Seventh Circuit joined the Second Circuit in holding that the
FHAA reasonable accommodation provision, as a matter of law, never includes
accommodating the economic disadvantages caused by a disability.
B. Supreme Court Insight on Reasonable Accommodation-Barnett
As already explained, the Court's approach to the reasonable accommodation
concept in Barnett, although it addressed the ADA provision, is extremely important in
our analysis of the Salute line of cases because of the congressional intent to
incorporate the reasonable accommodation doctrine into the FHAA provision.10 5 Thus,
Barnett would not be binding over the FHAA cases, but it should nevertheless be
extremely persuasive due to the similarities between the two provisions.
In Barnett, the Court was faced with the same type of argument that the Salute line
of cases supports. U.S. Airways claimed that its seniority system, a disability-neutral
workplace policy, would automatically "trump[] a conflicting accommodation
Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Vill. of Richton Park, No. 96 C 1268, 1998 WL 100291, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 12, 1998).
99. Hemisphere, 171 F.3d at 438.
100. Id. at 439.
101. Id. at 438-39.
102. Id. at 439.
103. Id. at 440.
104. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments,
136 F.3d 293, 301-02 (2d Cir. 1998); Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson, 84 F.3d 960 (7th Cir.
1996); Brandt v. Vill. of Chebanse, 82 F.3d 172 (7th Cir. 1996)).
105. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
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demand."' ° It argued that the reasonable accommodation provision only granted
"equal" treatment for the disabled.10 7 If an employer were to ignore its seniority system
in order to accommodate a disabled worker like Barnett, then it would be granting the
disabled worker a special and preferential treatment that was not available to
nondisabled employees.'0 8 According to U.S. Airways, such an accommodation would
not be consistent with the wording of the reasonable accommodation provision because
it would grant a preference to disabled employees-not put them on "equal" ground
with the nondisabled.109 Recall that this is the same logical sequence that the Second
Circuit used in order to reach its conclusion that the FHAA reasonable accommodation
provision could not require landlords to accommodate for the economic status of
disabled individuals when such accommodations would favor the disabled Section 8
applicants above the nondisabled Section 8 applicants. "
0
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument, holding that there was no
automatic exemption for disability-neutral rules. As the Court explained, this argument
failed to recognize that any accommodation received by a disabled individual could be
considered a type of preferential treatment:
While linguistically logical, this argument fails to recognize what the Act
specifies, namely, that preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the
Act's basic equal opportunity goal. The Act requires preferences in the form of
"reasonable accommodations" that are needed for those with disabilities to obtain
the same workplace opportunities that those without disabilities automatically
enjoy. By definition any special "accommodation" requires the employer to treat
an employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially. And the fact that the
difference in treatment violates an employer's disability-neutral rule cannot by
itself place the accommodation beyond the Act's potential reach."'
Were this not so, then the provision could never accomplish its intended purpose,
because each accommodation of a disability-neutral rule could be considered a
preference. If a disability-neutral rule received an automatic exemption to the statute,
then, for example, "[n]eutral office assignment rules would automatically prevent the
accommodation of an employee whose disability-imposed limitations require him to
work on the ground floor." '  12 Not only did the employer's argument not logically fit
with the purpose of the reasonable accommodation provision, but also "Congress...
said nothing suggesting that the presence of such neutral rules would create an
automatic exemption. ' ' 13 For these reasons, the Court found that providing a
106. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
111. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397 (emphasis in original).
112. Id. at 397-98. The court likewise provides the following examples: "Neutral
'break-from-work' rules would automatically prevent the accommodation of an individual who
needs additional breaks from work, perhaps to permit medical visits. Neutral furniture budget
rules would automatically prevent the accommodation of an individual who needs a different
kind of chair or desk." Id. at 398.
113. Id.
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preference to a disabled individual in the face of a disability-neutral rule would not
ipso facto justify an automatic exemption from the ADA reasonable accommodation
provision. "
4
C. The Barnett Doctrine and the FHAA-Giebeler v. M & B Associates
Because Barnett dealt with the ADA's reasonable accommodation provision, and
not the FHAA's provision, it does not directly overrule the Salute line of cases.
Nevertheless, there is clear tension between the reasoning used by the Supreme Court
in Barnett and the reasoning used by the circuit courts in the Salute line of cases." 5 In
2003, the Ninth Circuit was faced with the same question presented in the Salute line
of cases."16 In fact, the defendant/landlord in Giebeler, along with the district court,
relied on both Salute and Hemisphere to argue for an automatic exemption." 7 But,
drawing on the additional insight provided by Barnett, the Ninth Circuit arrived at the
opposite conclusion as the Salute courts.'" t
In Giebeler, the disabled individual requested that the landlord change his policy
against cosigners in order to allow Giebeler to have his mother cosign the rent
application, thus allowing Giebeler to satisfy the application's financial
requirements.' 19 When the landlord refused to change his policy against cosigners,
Giebeler brought suit under the FHAA, claiming that the defendant/landlord
discriminated against Giebeler by not making the appropriate reasonable
accommodations in the application procedure.120 The defendant/landlord relied on the
reasoning used by the courts in Salute and Hemisphere, arguing that "accommodations
of one's personal economic situation are outside the scope of the FHAA's reasonable
accommodation requirement,"'12 and thus he should be automatically exempted from
the reasonable accommodation provision. Following Salute's reasoning, the
defendant/landlord stated two reasons why he should receive an automatic exemption
from the reasonable accommodation provision of the FHAA: (1) making the
accommodation would "prefer disabled over nondisabled impecunious individuals,'
' 22
and (2) changing the financial requirements would "accommodate Giebeler's poverty
rather than his disability.' 23
The defendant/landlord's first argument was the same disability-neutral-rule
argument that the Salute court upheld.124 The Giebeler court, however, correctly
rejected this argument. Instead, Giebeler focused on the analysis provided by the
Supreme Court in Barnett,125 in which the Court held that "[tihe Act requires
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 79-114 and accompanying text.
116. Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003).
117. Id. at 1153.
118. See id. at 1154.
119. Id. at 1145-46.
120. Id. at 1146.
121. Id. at 1153.
122. Id. at 1148.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
125. See Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1154.
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preferences in the form of 'reasonable accommodations' that are needed for those with
disabilities to obtain the same workplace opportunities that those without disabilities
automatically enjoy."'126 This same principle applies to the FHAA provision. If the
provision were not allowed to grant preferences, then the provision could never
accomplish its intended purpose, because every accommodation of a disability-neutral
rule would be considered a preference.'
27
To illustrate this point, consider the two examples provided in the HUD regulations
of when a reasonable accommodation would be required: (1) the lifting of a no-pets
rule to allow use of a seeing-eye dog; and (2) the waiver of a first-come, first-serve
parking policy to accommodate a person suffering from multiple sclerosis.' 2 Both of
these examples involve disability-neutral policies. An accommodation given to a
disabled tenant under either of these policies would create a preference for disabled
tenants over nondisabled tenants. Yet, even the Salute court recognized that these were
valid reasonable accommodations under the provision. 29 In light of Barnett, Giebeler
recognized Salute's error in upholding this disability-neutral policy argument. Thus,
regardless of whether the request for accommodation arises under the ADA or under
the FHAA, the mere fact that the requested accommodation would grant preference to
a disabled individual, does not, "in and of itself,'130 automatically exempt the
defendant/landlord from providing that accommodation.
The defendant/landlord argued in the alternative that he was automatically exempt
from the provision because the requested accommodation would accommodate
Giebeler's economic status rather than his disability.' 3 ' According to this argument,
because the FHAA only prohibited a landlord from discriminating against a disabled
renter because of his disability,'32 discriminating against Giebeler's economic status,
and not his disability, could not violate the FHAA. Again, this argument mirrors the
reasoning of the Second Circuit in Salute: "We think it is fundamental that the law
addresses the accommodation of handicaps, not the alleviation of economic
disadvantages that may be correlated with having handicaps."' 133 It is, however,
important to recognize the difference between an argument based on correlation and
one based on causation. Neither the Second Circuit nor the defendant/landlord in
Giebeler discussed whether a causal link existed between the disability and the
plaintiff's poverty. Instead, the Second Circuit only recognized that the two are
"correlated." 134 Because the court failed to investigate the causal relationship, its ruling
clearly does not align with either the plain wording of the statute or the Supreme
Court's holding in Barnett.
As previously stated, the FHAA prohibits a landlord from discriminating against a
disabled renter because of his disability.' 35 Therefore, at the very least, the plain
126. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (emphasis in original).
127. See id.
128. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) (2004).
129. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 1998).
130. Bamett, 535 U.S. at 398 (emphasis in original).
131. Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9 h Cir. 2003).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(2) (2000).
133. Salute, 136 F.3d at 301.
134. Id.
135.42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(2).
2005]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
wording of the statute allows accommodations for the physical, mental, or social status
of a disabled individual, so long as the disability was the cause of the status. Even the
dissent in Barnett recognized that where a causal relationship existed, a reasonable
accommodation would be necessary.' 36 In addition, the majority in Barnett, by
rejecting Justice Scalia's narrow interpretation of the provision, left open the question
of whether there must be a direct causal relationship at all, thus leaving the door open
to an argument that only a correlation, and not a causal relationship, must exist
between those barriers faced by disabled individuals.'
37
Regardless of whether the FHAA provision actually extends so far to include
correlated barriers, Barnett left no doubt that the provision includes those barriers that
the renter's disability causes. However, the Salute court argued that no causal
relationship existed because the economic status of a disabled individual was too
remote from the disability.'3 8 In reaching this conclusion, the* court attempted to
distinguish the economic status case from the seeing-eye dog and parking cases139 _
cases which are clearly accepted as valid reasonable accommodations cases under the
FHAA'4----by arguing that, in the latter cases, "it is the handicap that is [directly]
accommodated.' 4' However, as the dissenting opinion in Salute recognized, there is
really no difference between these cases and the economic status case:
But, in fact, in the seeing-eye dog and parking examples cited by the majority, it is
not the handicap itself that is directly accommodated by the change in a policy.
Rather, it is the need that was created by the particular handicap that is
accommodated. Thus, a person's blindness creates the need for a seeing-eye dog,
and a person's multiple sclerosis leads to impaired mobility, which, in turn, creates
the need for a priority parking space close to the tenant's residence. 1
42
136. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 413 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "the ADA eliminates workplace barriers only if a disability prevents an employee
from overcoming them-those barriers that would not be barriers but for the employee's
disability") (emphasis in original).
137. See id. at 398; see also Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d1143, 1150 (9th Cir.
2003) (recognizing that "Barnett indicates, inferentially if not expressly, that a required
accommodation need not address 'barriers that would not be barriers but for the [individual's]
disability' (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting Barnett, 535 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting))); United States v. City of Philadelphia, 838 F. Supp. 223, 229 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
("[T]he language of § 3604(f) does not suggest that to establish a Fair Housing Act violation, a
plaintiff must show a 'causal nexus' between the challenged provision and the handicaps of the
prospective residents.").
138. See Salute, 136 F.3d at 301.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 894-95 (7th Cir.
1996) (parking space as accommodation for multiple sclerosis sufferer); Bronk v. Ineichen, 54
F.3d 425, 429 (7th Cir. 1995) (hearing dog as accommodation for deaf individuals); Shapiro v.
Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 330 (2d Cir. 1995) (parking space as accommodation for
multiple sclerosis sufferer); United States v. Bd. of Trs. for Univ. of Ala., 908 F.2d 740, 746
(11 th Cir. 1990) (sign language interpreter as accommodation for deaf students); 24 C.F.R. §
100.204(b).
141. Salute, 136 F.3d at 301.
142. Id. at 308 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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Likewise, the disabled individual in Salute argued that, but for his disability, he
would not be in the economic situation that he was in, and thus he would have
otherwise qualified for the apartment. In short, he argued that his disability created the
need for a cosigner or for a Section 8 voucher. This same causal relationship,
recognized by the court, existed in Giebeler.143 Barnett makes clear that where these
causal relationships exist, reasonable accommodations cannot be automatically
exempted-notwithstanding the erroneous decision in Salute.144
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Fair Housing Amendments Act was to codify the means to
accomplish the "national commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with
handicaps from the American mainstream."' 45 To achieve this goal, the FHAA requires
that landlords and property managers provide reasonable accommodations in their
rules and policies. This provision has allowed the disabled community to make great
143. Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003).
144. Even though Salute's holding that "accommodations of one's personal economic
situation are [automatically] outside the scope of the FHAA's reasonable accommodation
requirement" is incorrect in light of Barnett, Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1151, Salute may
nevertheless have reached the correct result because of the second prong of the reasonable
accommodation test. Recall that all reasonable accommodation cases have two issues to be
decided: (1) whether the requested accommodation falls within the scope of the provision, and
(2) whether the requested accommodation is reasonable. See supra notes 73-76 and
accompanying text. As discussed throughout this Note, the conflicting holdings in the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits all pertain to the first prong of the inquiry-defining
"accommodation." These cases, therefore, do not address the issue of the reasonableness of the
requested accommodation. Despite the fact that the Salute court incorrectly held that the request
to modify the rental policies was not an accommodation within the scope of the FHAA
provision, the court could have found that such an accommodation was unreasonable. In fact,
the court did.
Generally an accommodation is reasonable under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0 so long as it does not
impose 'undue financial or administrative burdens' or requires a 'fundamental alteration in the
nature of a program."' Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson, 84 F.3d 960, 962 (7th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Southeastern Comm. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410, 412 (1979)); see also
Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir. 1994). More specifically, "the
determination of whether a particular modification is 'reasonable' involves a fact-specific, case-
by-case inquiry that considers, among other factors, the effectiveness of the modification... and
the cost to the organization that would implement it." Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353,
356 (2d Cir. 1995). In Salute, the Second Circuit determined that the requested accommodation,
requiring a landlord to alter his policy and accept Section 8 renters if they are disabled, was not
reasonable because (1) the Section 8 program was intended to be a strictly voluntary program,
and (2) the program would involve substantial government involvement that would be
burdensome on the landlord. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. For the purposes of
this Note it is not important how the Second Circuit resolved the reasonableness issue; however,
it is important to recognize that just because there are no automatic exemptions, based on the
economic status of the disabled, available to the landlords in these cases, the courts can still
determine that the requested accommodation is unreasonable.
145. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,2179.
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strides in integrating themselves into the American society. For example, blind
individuals who need the assistance of seeing-eye dogs can now find homes in the
many buildings that do not allow pets, and persons suffering from multiple sclerosis no
longer have to fight for parking spots that are close to their apartments. However, when
it comes to making reasonable accommodations in the landlord's rent-admission
policies, some jurisdictions still permit the exclusion of disabled individuals from the
mainstream of our society. Such discrimination cannot be tolerated, neither as a matter
of social policy nor as a matter of law.
